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ABSTRACT
International law grants states, as representatives of their peoples, the 
right to use and exploit the natural resources located on their territories. 
The aim of this paper is to clarify how the doctrine of peoples’ sovereignty 
over natural resources is related to their right to political self-determination. 
Three different perceptions of this relationship are examined. First, the 
view that peoples have collective ownership rights over the natural 
resources to be found on their territories is criticized and rejected. 
Thereafter, it is argued that instrumentalist reasons fail to explain why a 
people’s right to political self-determination implies sovereignty over 
natural resources. Instead, it is suggested to consider sovereignty over 
natural resources a necessary component of a people’s authority over the 
territory where their right to self-determination is realized. The proposed 
solution provides a sensible framework for dealing with practical issues, as 
can be exemplified by post-secession conflicts over natural resources. 
Keywords: collective self-determination, global justice, harm principle, 
natural resources, secession, territory.
1. INTRODUCTION
In international politics it is widely accepted that states are entitled to use 
the natural resources which are located on their territories to their own 
benefit. The many conflicts over natural resources we currently witness 
typically concern specific issues, such as the precise national borders 
between two countries. That states have sovereignty over natural resources 
– or rather the peoples represented by states – is hardly called into question 
by relevant international actors. Furthermore, the assignment of special 
resource rights to territorially concentrated collectives has a secure basis 
in international law. Most notably, Article 1 of the two major Human 
Rights Covenants from 1966 recognizes the right of peoples to political 
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self-determination. This right implies, as stated in the same article, the 
entitlement to freely dispose of the natural resources which are found 
within the respective territorial units. 
By contrast, the philosophical debate has been considering the principle 
of resource sovereignty mainly from a global justice perspective. Several 
authors have called into question whether peoples can establish special 
claims to spatially defined shares of the world’s resources while excluding 
all other human beings. In their view, advantages gained from the unequal 
distribution of natural resources are morally arbitrary and in need of 
correction.1 However, what has received much less attention in the recent 
philosophical debate is the rationale for seeing resource sovereignty as an 
important component of the right to collective self-determination. The 
aim of this paper is to examine in some detail how both concepts – collective 
self-determination and authority over natural resources – relate to each 
other. By clarifying this conceptual link at the theoretical level I also hope 
to contribute to a better understanding of various practical problems.
The argument is subject to two restrictions. First, within the scope of 
this paper I cannot address the fundamental objections global justice 
theorists have raised to the sovereignty rights of states or peoples. Instead 
I start out from the assumption that the right of peoples to political self-
determination can be justified and try to elucidate how this right relates to 
resource claims. The argument will, however, show that recognizing 
peoples’ authority over natural resources is in principle compatible with 
major demands of global justice.2 Moreover, even the critics of the current 
state system may agree that attempts to establish global political 
institutions are not likely to succeed in the foreseeable future. Thus, a 
thorough analysis of the concept of political self-determination may prove 
to be helpful for reflecting on criteria of justice under non-ideal conditions.
Second, my argument relies on a rather conventional understanding of 
the term “natural resources”. I take natural resources to be materials or 
substances of some economic value, which exist without the actions of 
human beings, such as fertile land, minerals, or water. This is not to deny 
that more sophisticated models that have been recently proposed, e.g. Tim 
Hayward’s (2006) “eco-space conception” or Avery Kolers’ (2012) 
“intentional conception”, may provide important insights. Again, it would 
go beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the current debate on the 
adequate understanding of natural resources. Although I expect my 
1  Criticism of the resource privilege of states or peoples has been offered inter alia 
by Pogge (2008: 202-221) and Armstrong (2015) and (2017: 132-149).
2  For an instructive discussion of how the ideal of global equality can be reconciled 
with the right of peoples to political self-determination, see Armstrong (2010). 
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discussion of the right to collective self-determination to be relevant for 
more refined conceptions, I cannot demonstrate this here.
The argument proceeds by three steps. In the second section, I will 
explore the development of the right of peoples to political self-
determination – with a special focus on the doctrine of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources – in international law. Thereafter, in the 
third section, I will discuss three possible explanations of how natural 
resources may be linked with a group’s entitlement to independently 
decide on its common future. First, they may be seen as the common 
property of a people; second, they may have an instrumental value for the 
achievement of a people’s collectively determined goals; or, third, resource 
sovereignty may be an essential component of a people’s claim to a territory 
of its own. After having advanced my arguments for the latter view, I will, 
in the fourth section, dwell on some of its implications. More precisely, I 
will ask what the proposed interpretation has to say on the handling of 
competing resource claims, which may emerge in the wake of secession or 
state dissolution. Finally, in the last section I will briefly summarize the 
main findings of my analysis.
2. RESOURCE SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The principle of people’s permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
has its roots in the period of decolonization. Its development was 
characterized by a conflict of interests between colonial peoples and newly 
independent states on the one hand and the prosperous states of the West 
on the other hand. The former actors were anxious to gain political 
independence and, if achieved, to expand their ability to pursue common 
goals. Control over natural resources was, in their view, an important 
precondition for substantial self-determination and successful economic 
development (Schrijver 2010b: sec. C2). The (former) colonial powers, by 
contrast, worried about a possible shortage of raw materials and, 
consequently, detrimental effects on the global economy. Moreover, they 
feared that the decolonized states might nationalize foreign companies 
without offering sufficient compensation for their investments.
The emergence of the concept of resource sovereignty in international 
law was closely connected with the development of a right to collective 
self-determination. The first significant legal document mentioning the 
political self-determination of peoples was the Charter of the United 
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Nations in 1945.3 Article 1.2 of the Charter states: 
“The purposes of the United Nations are: … to develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace.” 
There is wide agreement that at this time the self-determination of 
peoples had to be understood as a guiding principle for the peaceful 
coexistence of the community of states. However, in the years to come the 
principle of self-determination quickly developed into a legal right peoples 
under foreign rule could refer to. A crucial role in this process played 
Resolution 1514 of the United Nation’s General Assembly (UNGA) from 
1960, which called for bringing colonization to a speedy and unconditional 
end. In the so-called Decolonization Resolution the member states of the 
United Nations unanimously recognized a right of all peoples to self-
determination. Although UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, they 
provide evidence of the predominant conception of international law.
The view that a right to self-determination is existent in common law 
has been further substantiated in the process of decolonization, as many 
colonial peoples were able to gain political independence by appealing to 
their right to self-determination. In 1966, when the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were established, the 
right to self-determination was provided with a secure foundation in 
international treaty law. Both Human Rights Covenants stipulated 
identically in their Arts. 1.1: 
“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right  
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”4
In 1952 two UNGA resolutions for the first time linked the self-
determination of under-developed countries or peoples with the right to 
exploit natural resources. Resolution 523 stipulated “that the under-
developed countries have the right to determine freely the use of their 
natural resources.” Resolution 626 stated “that the right of peoples freely to 
3  The principle has been discussed at least since President Wilson’s famous 
“fourteen points“ and has been present in the thoughts of Lenin and Stalin but was not 
included in the regulations of the League of Nations.
4  Evidently, there is a tension between the right of peoples to self-determination 
and the right of states to territorial integrity as it is enshrined, most importantly, in Art. 2.4 
of the United Nation’s Charter. The entitlement of some part of a population, e.g. a colonial 
people, to freely determine its political status is difficult to reconcile with the inviolability of 
the established borders.
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use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their 
sovereignty and is in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
charter of the United Nations.”5 For two reasons these resolutions met 
resistance by the USA, Great Britain, and other highly industrialized states. 
First, these states complained that the interests of prosperous economies 
to have access to raw materials were not sufficiently taken into account. 
Second, they were concerned about the resolutions’ potential for 
legitimizing the expropriation of foreign companies and the annulment 
of concessions. This worry was fueled, most importantly, by the 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, enforced by the then 
socialist Iranian government in 1951 (Schrijver 1997: 37-49). The main 
reason for voting against resolution 626, given by the US delegation, was 
the lack of any provision for adequate compensation in the case of 
expropriation (Hyde 1956: 860).
The discussion on resource rights continued during the drafting 
process of the United Nations’ two major human rights covenants. In 1958 
the UNGA adopted resolution 1314, which confirmed “that the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination … includes permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.” By this resolution a 
special commission was established in order to “conduct a full survey of 
this basic constituent of the right to self-determination.” The view that 
natural resources are a basic constituent of the right to self-determination 
was reaffirmed in the UNGA declaration 1803 on the permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources from 1962. Primarily two provisions prompted the 
Western states – with the exception of France – to vote in favor of this 
resolution. First, the declaration required of states which expropriate 
foreign holdings to pay the owner adequate compensation and, second, it 
stated that foreign investment agreements freely entered by signatory 
parties shall be observed in good faith (Schwebel 1994: 401-415).
The resolution on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources for 
the first time addressed an important aspect of internal self-determination, 
by commenting on the question of who is supposed to benefit from the 
extraction of resources. According to par. 1, the right to dispose of a 
country’s natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of 
“the well-being of the people of the state concerned”. This is an important 
clarification, as experience has shown that in many cases the ruling elites 
5  According to Schrijver (2015: 23-24), the term “natural wealth” refers to the 
resource basis as distinguished from the natural resources themselves. For instance, the 
forest and the fertile soil constitute (part of) a country’s natural wealth, whereas the timber 
of the trees and the tea or coffee plants count as natural resources.
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have commercially exploited the raw materials to their own advantage.6 
The resolution on peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
paved the way for the inclusion of resource rights in the two human rights 
treaties of 1966. Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR state identically in their 
Arts. 1.2:
“All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence”.7
In more recent debates on peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources two topics have come into focus. First, the right to extract and 
make use of natural resources has increasingly been placed in the context 
of environmental protection. In 1972 the Stockholm Declaration of the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment for the first time specified 
obligations entailed by peoples’ resource sovereignty. Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration specifies: 
“States have … the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction”.8
While the Stockholm Declaration was mainly concerned with the 
prevention of external damage, later UN documents entertained a more 
comprehensive view of environmental protection. A crucial role for the 
development of international environmental law played the concept of 
“sustainable development”, which was introduced by the so-called 
Brundtland Commission in 1987.9 The goal of sustainable development has 
been cited in many international legal documents, thereby constraining 
the right of peoples to exploit their natural wealth and resources (Schrijver 
2010a: 59-66). A telling example is the preamble of the UN Convention on 
6  The moral responsibilities of other states with regard to governments who fail to 
manage natural resources in the interests of their peoples are discussed in Wenar (2008) and 
(2016: 281-334), see also Haugen (2014).
7  Art. 25 (ICESCR) and Art. 47 (ICCPR) state in unison: “Nothing in the present 
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and 
utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”
8  The wording of this principle is reiterated – with only one slight alteration – in 
principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development from 1992.
9  The Brundtland report defines sustainable development as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”
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Biological Diversity from 1992, where the contracting parties reaffirm 
“that States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources 
[and …] are responsible for conserving their biological diversity and for 
using their biological resources in a sustainable manner.”10
Second, the intrastate allocation of the entitlement to exploit natural 
resources has become an important concern of international law. A 
growing body of legal documents has recognized that the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources applies to indigenous 
communities. Most importantly, the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples from 2007 states in Art. 3: “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.” Furthermore, Art. 26.1 states: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” It is now a 
widely shared view in international law that different peoples within one 
state may possess rights over different territories and the respective 
resources (Miranda 2012: 806-828, Pereira and Gough 2013: 20-34). Thus, 
states are not only obliged to manage the natural resources which are 
located within their borders in their citizens’ interests; they must also take 
into account that the population may consist of several peoples, each with 
its own resource rights.11
3. RESOURCE RIGHTS AS BASIC CONSTITUENT OF 
COLLECTIVE SELF-DETERMINATION 
The previous section has shown that international law conceives of 
resource sovereignty as an integral part of peoples’ right to political self-
determination. However, neither the relevant legal documents nor the 
drafting process that preceded their ratification make sufficiently clear 
how these concepts are connected with each other. In the following, I will 
discuss three possible explanations why an entitlement to collective self-
determination might imply resource rights. First, I will deal with the 
understanding that self-determining entities have property rights (or 
similarly created sovereignty rights) to the natural resources of a given 
10  A normative argument for the restriction of peoples’ permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources by environmental standards is presented in Gümplová (2014).
11  As a further problem area one might mention resource sovereignty in occupied 
territories, which has been addressed by the International Court of Justice in several 
decisions, e.g. the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion of 2004 and the Armed Activities Case 
(Congo v. Uganda) of 2005. For a detailed analysis, see Dam-De Jong (2015).
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territory. Subsequently, I will explore instrumentalist accounts according 
to which a group’s capacity to exert its self-determination right crucially 
depends on the availability of natural resources. After having outlined the 
main shortcomings of these views, I will argue for considering sovereignty 
over natural resources a necessary component of a people’s authority over 
the territory where its self-determination takes place. Finally, I will discuss 
two objections that may be raised to my position.
3.1. Property and Quasi-Property Rights
The legal documents on peoples’ self-determination rights, which I discussed 
in the second section, recurrently speak of “their” natural resources. The 
use of the possessive pronoun “their” might indicate the existence of a 
collective property right, which predates the right to political self-
determination. According to this assumption, sovereignty over natural 
resources is not to be understood as an enabling condition for the exercise 
of the right to political self-determination. The exploitation (or 
conservation) of natural resources is rather within the scope of issues on 
which a people, by virtue of its ownership, is entitled to decide. Like an 
individual may determine the use of the goods she owns, the members of a 
people may jointly determine the use of their common possessions.12
An important challenge for an ownership account is to explain how 
collectives, such as peoples, acquire property rights over natural resources. 
In classical political thought, basically two mechanisms of how property 
rights come into existence – by first appropriation of previously unowned 
objects or by mixing one’s labor with such objects – are discussed. The 
historic versions of both theories start out from the assumption that God 
has devoted his creation to the whole of humanity. The original common 
possession of entire mankind is then, by a series of individual acts, 
transformed into a system of private ownership. According to a first 
appropriation account, as defended for instance by Hugo Grotius, a person 
who is first to settle on a hitherto uninhabited area acquires a property 
right to the land and its natural resources. By contrast, the core idea of the 
labor mixing account, which was initially advanced by John Locke, is that 
from the very beginning everybody is the owner of herself. If a person 
invests labor in a natural good, she merges this good with a part of her 
body, which already constitutes her individual property. Thereby she 
significantly increases the value of the good concerned and excludes the 
12  To be clear, a collective ownership right – as I understand the term here – does not 
entitle each member of the collective to use the goods concerned at her discretion. Instead 
the ownership right is held by the group as a whole: the individuals belonging to the group 
or their representatives must decide jointly – by a majority vote or some other procedure – on 
how to exercise this right.
36 Frank Dietrich 
LEAP 6 (2018)
rights of all other people to make use of it.13
From the perspectives of both theories only individuals are capable of 
acquiring property rights – either by first seizing previously unowned 
goods or by investing labor in them. Hence, the crucial question is how a 
people can come into the rightful possession of all natural resources 
located on the territory where it exercises its political self-determination. A 
possible answer is that the individuals who first acquired property rights 
over natural resources acted on behalf of the people. Think, for instance, of 
a ship’s captain who discovers a previously unknown island and who 
declares, when going ashore, to take possession of this island in the name 
of, let us say, Spain.14 Although a first appropriation of natural resources by 
a people’s representative is conceivable, it can, at best, provide part of an 
explanation. The example of the ship’s captain presupposes the existence 
of a Spanish state, which already has authority over a territory and its 
natural resources. Even if one admits that the ship’s captain was entitled to 
seize the island on behalf of the Spanish people, it is still unclear how this 
people’s claim to collectively own the natural resources of the Spanish 
heartland could be justified.
Another response to the here discussed problem is that the individual 
members of a people voluntarily transferred their property rights over 
natural resources to the collective. Seemingly, John Locke (1960 [1689]: II 
§120) comes close to such an idea when he declares: “By the same Act … 
whereby any one unites his Person, which was before free, to any 
Commonwealth; by the same he unites his Possessions, which were before 
free to it also.” However, what Locke has in mind is – I think – that the 
persons concerned submit their property to the jurisdictional authority of 
the state. In his view, the individuals in the state of nature have strong 
reasons to enter into a political society in order to obtain protection for 
their possessions. Therefore, they are prepared to vest the state with as 
much jurisdictional authority as necessary (and as little as possible) for the 
performance of its protective function. It is, however, hard to see why the 
persons who join a political society should transfer their property rights 
over natural resources completely to the state, or rather to the people 
constituting the state. They have no reason to relinquish their property 
rights because it is precisely the secure enjoyment of their possessions 
what motivates them to establish a state in the first place. At most, they 
might grant the state limited rights of intervention, such as the competence 
13  For a recent revitalization of Grotius’ theory, see Risse (2012: 89-129); for a detailed 
examination of Locke’s argument, see Simmons (1992: 222-306).
14  In a different context, Locke (1960 [1689]: II §28) admits the acquisition of property 
at the behest of another person by stating: “(…) the Turfs my Servant has cut (…) become my 
Property, without the assignation or consent of any body”.
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to raise taxes in order to finance police services. However, since they would 
not assent to substantial intrusions into their private property, the state 
would not obtain anything close to a collective ownership right.15
More recently, an argument has been advocated that may be understood 
as a culturalist modification of Locke’s labor mixing approach. So called 
liberal nationalist authors, such as David Miller (1995: 21-27, 2007: 214-230 
and 2012), Chaim Gans (2003: 97-123), and Tamar Meisels (2009), have 
pointed out to the formative influences the culture of a nation exerts on a 
territory.16 The members of a national community employ specific forms of 
agriculture, build roads and ports, and establish particular settlement 
structures. These cultural activities leave a lasting imprint on the territory, 
which distinguishes it from other geographical places. Persons identifying 
with a national community typically have strong emotional bonds to the 
area they regard as their homeland. Since the territory is shaped by their 
culture and closely connected to the nation’s history, they cannot imagine 
realizing their collective self-determination anywhere else.17 By analogy 
with Locke, it has also been argued that the national community put the 
piece of land it traditionally occupies to an efficient use. Over time, the 
various cultural activities of the group add material as well as symbolic 
value to the land (Meisels 2009: 97-112 and Miller 2012: 257-262).18
From a liberal nationalist perspective, the above considerations – 
cultural formation, emotional attachment, value enhancement – legitimize 
the claims of nations to “their” territories. It is important to note that, 
contrary to Locke’s account, territorial rights are not conceived of as 
collective ownership rights. Instead, national communities are thought to 
have an entitlement to exert jurisdictional authority over their traditional 
15  For a critical examination of Locke’s property theory of territorial rights, see Beitz 
(1980).
16  It may be worth noting that the above-mentioned theorists speak of “nations” or 
“national communities” instead of “peoples”. For the question under discussion – the link 
between collective self-determination rights and sovereignty over natural resources – this 
terminological difference seems, however, irrelevant.
17  As regards personal attachment, Miller (2007: 219) states: “The case for having 
rights over the relevant territory is (…) straightforward: it gives members of the nation 
continuing access to places that are especially significant to them, and it allows choices to 
be made over how these sites are to be protected and managed”.
18  The theory of resource rights advocated by Cara Nine (2012: 137-141) borrows from 
different aspects of Locke’s political thought. In her view, a group acquires resource rights 
when it uses the resources concerned in a value-generating way, whereby she considers the 
achievement of political justice the relevant value.
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areas of settlement.19 The liberal nationalist’s argument has the advantage 
of avoiding the problem with which Locke’s appropriation theory has 
to grapple. Since the labor, which needs to be “mixed” with the land, is 
understood as the joint activities of a culturally defined nation, the creation 
of a collective right seems more plausible. It is not the work of particular 
individuals but the common and ongoing efforts of a nation that shape 
some piece of land and, thereby, establish a claim to it. Hence, the culturalist 
reinterpretation of Locke’s account need not explain how individual rights 
can be transformed into collective rights of a nation or a people.
The liberal nationalist’s argument for sovereignty over natural 
resources faces, however, a serious problem. It needs to be shown how the 
cultural activities of national communities, on which their territorial 
claims depend, bear on natural resources. To be sure, the agricultural and 
settlement practices of national communities may shape the surface of the 
land and create strong feelings of belonging. Moreover, certain natural 
resources, such as coal or diamonds, and the transgenerational project of 
their exploitation may play an important role for a national culture (Miller 
2012: 263-264). However, a people’s sovereignty over natural resources is 
generally understood to comprise the whole range of raw materials that are 
situated within the relevant territory. Evidently, the members of a nation 
neither invest labor in every natural resource nor are they emotionally 
attached to every natural resource. For instance, the wood of an unmanaged 
forest and the water of a small, untouched river are not subject to any 
cultural activity. Furthermore, it is hard to see on which grounds a people 
might claim a right to the future use of still undiscovered resources. The 
above-sketched reinterpretation of Locke’s appropriation argument 
cannot extend to resources into which no cultural labor has been invested.
In sum, the here discussed account may, at best, justify the claim of 
national communities to exert their right to political self-determination on 
a particular territory.20 However, even if territorial rights can be established 
in principle, the question which competences these rights include still has 
to be settled. In the philosophical debate it has been widely taken for 
granted that the justification of a territorial claim encompasses the whole 
19  The jurisdictional authority of a people includes the competence to establish and 
modify a system of property rights on the territory concerned. Thus, a people (or its political 
representatives) may decide to nationalize natural resources or to allow private property 
rights. For an important critique of the conflation of “property rights” and “sovereignty 
rights” in current nationalist debates, see Fleischacker (2013).
20  For a critical examination of the liberal nationalist’s justification of territorial 
claims, see Dietrich (2011: 87-89).
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set of rights conventionally attributed to states.21 But the reasons that can 
be given for the substantiation of a territorial claim do not necessarily 
apply to each of its standard components. The liberal nationalist’s 
argument fails to explain why a group’s right to political self-determination 
entails an entitlement to dispose of (the full range of) natural resources.
3.2. Instrumentalist Arguments
As set out in the second section, the right of peoples to political self-
determination emerged in the period of decolonization. At this time the 
freedom of newly created state communities to decide on their economic, 
social and cultural development was high on the agenda. Against this 
background, important legal documents refer to natural resources as 
means for the achievement of peoples’ independently chosen goals. Most 
notably, Articles 1.2 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR state: “All peoples may, 
for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural resources”. This 
formulation points to the instrumental value of natural resources for the 
exercise of the right to collective self-determination. Contrary to the 
interpretation discussed above, peoples do not acquire property rights (or 
similarly created jurisdictional rights) over natural resources by the work 
they invest on a given territory. Instead, they can claim authority over 
natural resources because their right to political self-determination would 
be void if an adequate material basis were lacking.22
The capacity of a people to make significant choices with regard to its 
common future depends, at least in part, on its prosperity. Roughly 
speaking, the more affluent a collective is, the more goals are attainable 
between which its member can freely decide. The revenues, which can be 
generated from the exploitation of natural resources, will normally 
enhance a people’s set of options. It seems, however, plausible to assume 
that the right to political self-determination only requires the availability 
of a minimum amount of alternatives. In order to make collective decisions, 
a people must be capable of choosing between different economic, social 
or cultural goals. Meaningful self-determination does not require a 
particularly extensive set of options and is consistent with considerable 
21  For a standard definition of territorial rights that encompasses authority over 
natural resources, see Simmons (2001: 306).
22  A different instrumentalist argument for the permanent sovereignty of peoples 
over natural resources was presented by John Rawls (1999: 38-39) in “A Law of Peoples”. 
According to Rawls, a sustainable management of natural resources can best be achieved by 
assigning territorial rights to specific agents. If a people has exclusive responsibility for a 
certain piece of territory, it will be interested in the long-term exploitation of the resources 
concerned and refrain from overexploitation. Since Rawls is mainly concerned with the 
preservation of the environment – rather than the economic preconditions for collective 
self-determination – I will not discuss his argument in more detail.
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wealth disparities between the right-holders. In this context, it should be 
recalled that Articles 1.2 of the two human rights covenants state: “In no 
case may a people be deprived of its means of subsistence”. The reference 
to the means of subsistence supports the view that the relevant regulations 
of international law focus on the basic prerequisites for the exercise of the 
right to self-determination.
Evidently, the instrumentalist interpretation must rely on an empirical 
assumption about the significance of natural resources for a people’s 
economic welfare. The research literature on the comparative development 
of resource-rich and resource-poor countries casts, however, doubts on 
the correctness of this thesis. To begin with, it seems questionable whether 
control over natural resources is necessary for achieving a minimum level 
of economic prosperity. There are other important factors, such as 
technological knowledge and the stability of political institutions, which 
contribute significantly to a people’s wealth.23 Thus, even a political 
community that widely lacks valuable raw materials may be able to 
generate the necessary economic means for exerting its self-determination 
right. Moreover, in the case of developing countries natural resources, 
such as oil and gemstones, have often proved to be a serious obstacle to 
economic progress. High resource income tends to increase government 
corruption and to help authoritarian regimes to ward off pressure for 
democratic reform. Competition for resource revenues is also likely to 
trigger violent intrastate conflicts, which impede a country’s economic 
development. In sum, what has become known as “resource curse” speaks 
against a positive correlation between wealth in resources and a people’s 
capacity for self-determination.24
On a more theoretical level, the here considered interpretation of 
peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources faces three closely 
related problems (Armstrong 2017: 142-143). First, what the instrumentalist 
account can establish is, at best, that self-determining collectives are in 
need of a certain amount of economic means. It fails, however, to give any 
reason why peoples have special claims to the natural resources that can 
be found on their respective state territories. Of course, it may appear 
obvious to specify the right holders’ claims in accordance with the existing 
state borders. But it is not the instrumental value of natural resources for 
the right to political self-determination that explains the link to a particular 
territory. The precise location of the natural resources a people has at its 
23  John Rawls (1999: 113-120) restricted duties of international assistance to the 
building of stable institutions because he deemed this to be the most important precondition 
for a country’s economic development.
24  The term “resource curse” has been introduced by Richard Auti (1993); an 
overview over recent research is given, for instance, in Ross (2015) and Venables (2016).
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disposal is largely irrelevant for its capacity to take its own decisions. In 
principle, people A could be enabled to exercise its right to self-
determination by granting it a claim to the resources of people B’s territory, 
and vice versa.
Second, I have argued above that the right to political self-determination 
should be understood as a threshold concept, requiring only the availability 
of a minimum amount of choices. If this is correct, the instrumentalist 
view can only succeed with explaining why peoples need natural resources 
(or other sources of income) to an extent necessary for realizing a basic set 
of options. It provides, however, no reason for granting self-determining 
collectives authority over the total amount of natural resources that are 
located on their territories. The claims of peoples to natural resources, 
which are, strictly speaking, not indispensable for exercising their rights to 
self-determination, must rely on a different justification.
Third, natural resources and the chances of profiting from their 
exploitation are very unequally distributed across the globe. According to 
the instrumentalist interpretation, peoples are entitled to the natural 
resources necessary for exercising their rights to political self-
determination. This implies that each right holder should have access to a 
certain amount of valuable raw materials, even if the territory under its 
control lacks significant deposits. The instrumentalist account thus 
mandates the reallocation of natural resources, or of the revenues derived 
from their exploitation, in order to enable less well-equipped peoples to 
exert their rights to political self-determination. As a consequence, it 
cannot provide a general justification for peoples’ permanent sovereignty 
over the whole set of natural resources located on their state territories. 
Peoples who have authority over more commodities than required for their 
self-determination are duty-bound to share their resource wealth with less 
fortunate right holders.
3.3. Territorial Rights
A more promising interpretation of peoples’ permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources is suggested by the efforts of colonial peoples to 
effectively end their domination by Western states. The independence 
movements were particularly concerned that the former colonial powers 
would continue to exert a strong influence on their newly established 
states. Sovereignty over natural resources was a sensitive issue insofar as 
foreign state or private companies had made significant investments in 
their exploitation. The colonial peoples considered their political self-
determination to be substantially impaired if other actors had decision-
making powers over (some part of) the natural resources situated within 
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the borders of their designated state territories. Their misgivings about a 
continued domination find, inter alia, expression in Par. 2 of UNGA 
resolution 1803:
“The exploration, development and disposition of … resources, as well 
as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes should 
be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and 
nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the 
authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities”.
The colonial peoples’ demand for non-domination draws attention to 
the crucial interest the right to political self-determination aims to protect. 
By granting this right in international law, the collectives concerned are 
supposed to be enabled to take independent decisions on their common 
future. However, a people cannot freely pursue its particular social, 
economic and cultural goals unless it has control over some piece of 
territory. It needs a clearly defined space where it can – undisturbed by 
other actors – implement its political decisions. If third parties pursuing 
conflicting goals were entitled to decide on the use of the territory 
concerned, a people might be unable to accomplish its common objectives. 
The territorial dimension of the right to political self-determination 
provides the key for understanding the conceptual link to the principle of 
resource sovereignty. Since a people’s right to political self-determination 
implies authority over some territory, it necessarily extends to the natural 
resources that are located within its borders (Moore 2015: 173-176). 
To illustrate the argument outlined above, it may be helpful to imagine 
a situation when a people’s right to self-determination would not comprise 
full authority over a defined territory. Think, for example, of an international 
company or some global institution having decision-making power over 
the extraction of coal within the state boundaries. The members of the 
people living on the territory may predominantly oppose coal mining, as it 
contradicts their own values, plans and projects. They may, for instance, 
attach great importance to the protection of the environment and the 
preservation of traditional settlements in the mining area. However, a 
majority decision to declare the region a natural reserve would be 
impossible to effectuate if some other actor were permitted to access the 
coal deposits. Consequently, assigning the right to decide on the 
exploitation of natural resources to a third party would seriously impair a 
people’s capacity for self-determination.
The here proposed interpretation has important consequences for the 
specification of the resource rights to which a self-determining collective 
is entitled. A people cannot exercise its right to political self-determination 
in a meaningful way unless it has authority over some piece of territory. 
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Therefore, it must have decision-making power over the exploitation (or 
conservation) of the natural resources located on the territory concerned. 
However, a people’s right to political self-determination does not imply a 
claim to the total earnings that can be derived from the natural resources. 
Thus, contrary to the conventional view in international law, a people’s 
right to political self-determination entails control rights over natural 
resources but fails to justify (the full set of) income rights.25
Restricting the scope of peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources to control rights allows for reconciling this doctrine with 
demands of global justice. Thomas Pogge (2008: 210-214), for instance, has 
proposed to introduce a “global resource dividend” as a mechanism for 
reducing the unequal distribution of wealth within the world population. 
According to Pogge, states should be permitted to make sovereign decisions 
on the exploitation of the natural resources that are located on their 
territories. However, if they decide to extract oil or other raw materials, 
they are required to transfer some percentage of their revenues to the 
global poor. Since the “global resource dividend” does not deny the control 
rights of self-determining collectives, it is fully compatible with the above-
sketched understanding of peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. It is important to note that I do not intend to make a case for the 
theory of global justice defended by Pogge or some other author. Within 
the scope of this paper, I cannot argue for or against a moral duty to 
redistribute wealth across national boundaries. I merely wish to point out 
that there is no fundamental contradiction between demands of global 
justice and the resource sovereignty of peoples.
Since control rights are at the core of the here defended view of resource 
sovereignty, it seems worthwhile to elaborate on their content and scope.26 
The right of peoples to political self-determination has to be understood as 
a prima facie right which can be trumped by conflicting moral 
considerations, such as the harm principle (Schuppert 2014: 76-77, Angeli 
2015: 98 and Stilz 2016: 100). By way of illustration, imagine a state that 
tests nuclear weapons in a desert region in close vicinity to a densely 
populated neighboring country. Clearly, the people’s right to take 
independent decisions on its defense policy does not include an entitlement 
to endanger the life and health of third parties. Since control rights over 
natural resources are closely connected to the ideal of political 
self-determination, they must be subject to the same restrictions. 
25  The distinction between control rights and income rights over natural resources 
has also been emphasized by Angeli (2015: 131-132) and Moore (2015: 173-176).
26  I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for urging me to clarify the 
concept of control rights.
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Consequently, peoples lack authority over natural resources if their 
exploitation (or conservation) inflicts harm on persons living outside the 
country.27 Of course, decisions on the extraction of raw materials normally 
do not cause immediate damage to third parties, as in the example of the 
nuclear weapons test. The use of natural resources can, however, 
substantially worsen the living conditions of other persons in an indirect 
manner. A people may, for instance, significantly contribute to the 
devastating effects of global warming by authorizing the deforestation of 
rainforests or the extraction of fossil fuels.
In order to determine the restrictions that need to be placed on peoples’ 
control rights over natural resources more precisely, two goals have to be 
considered. First and foremost, third parties must be protected from the 
harm self-determining collectives may inflict on them. The right to 
political self-determination includes neither a permit to damage other 
communities nor to expose them to serious risk. Second, a people’s capacity 
to realize its specific social, economic and cultural ambitions should be 
maintained to the widest possible extent. If there are two or more options 
of how the control rights of a people can be effectively constrained, the one 
that has the least negative impact on its political autonomy should be 
adopted.
For a proper understanding of the first goal, it is necessary to dwell on 
the concept of harm. Joel Feinberg (1986: 145-146, original emphasis) 
proposed to 
“think of harming as having two components: (1) It must lead to some 
kind of adverse effect, or create the danger of such an effect, on its 
victim’s interests; and (2) it must be inflicted wrongfully in violation of 
the victim’s rights”. 
Regarding the first component, a curtailment of individual or collective 
autonomy can only be justified if the neglect of other parties’ interests is 
significant.28 As the self-determination of an individual would be overly 
reduced if it were not allowed to pose relatively small risks on other actors, 
e.g. by driving a car, the political self-determination of a collective would 
be unduly diminished if it were required to rule out any possible negative 
externalities. Of course, it is difficult to state with any precision what extent 
of risk and damages other persons or groups must accept. It seems, 
however, to be clear that every assessment of the harm peoples may inflict 
on third parties has to take three aspects into account. The evaluation has 
27  Moreover, the right to political self-determination does not license a people to 
violate the basic interests of minority groups who live within the state boundaries.
28  According to Barboza (2011: 99-102), it is generally accepted in international law 
that an imposition of minor risks and damages has to be tolerated by the states concerned.
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to consider the magnitude of the damage, the likelihood of its occurrence, 
and – in cases of several actors sharing responsibility – the contribution of 
a specific people. The higher a people’s resource utilization scores on these 
criteria, the stronger is the argument for limiting its control rights.
Regarding the second component, Feinberg (1984: 218-221) emphasized 
that individuals often pursue competing goals, which they cannot realize 
without thwarting the interests of other parties. For instance, the successful 
sales strategy of shopkeeper A may cut the profits of shopkeeper B who 
loses a great number of customers. A’s conduct is, however, fully legitimate 
– she does not wrong B – and fails, therefore, to violate the harm principle. 
Likewise, state decisions placing other actors at a competitive disadvantage 
normally do not constitute harm in the relevant sense. By way of illustration, 
think of a country C that hitherto has been the only exporter of a valuable 
raw material. If another country started to extract and sell the same 
resource, C would not be wronged, although its economic situation might 
deteriorate as a result of falling prices. 
Finally, one may wonder whether peoples who refrain from extracting 
resources can inflict harm on third parties. The standard case of harm 
involves an action of party A that has a negative effect on party B, e.g. by 
causing an injury. Omitting an action, such as the extraction of resources, 
leaves the living conditions of other persons unchanged and does not 
worsen their situation. However, it is widely accepted that A’s omission of 
an action can harm B if A is obliged to perform this action. Think, for 
example, of a physician who fails to provide a patient with an urgently 
needed treatment because she does not want to be late for her dancing 
class. In this case, the patient is put in a worse position compared with the 
counterfactual scenario in which the physician had fulfilled her duty 
(Feinberg 1986: 148-150). Consequently, a people could harm third parties 
by abstaining from the exploitation of natural resources if it had a duty to 
make these resources available.29
As regards the second goal, it has to be examined more closely how the 
different forms the restriction of its control rights might take can affect a 
people’s capacity for self-determination. Above all, two aspects – the 
content of the limitation and the kind of competences which are conferred 
on other actors – need to be discussed. First, it makes an important 
difference whether a people is obliged to preserve or to extract (some part 
of) the natural resources located on its territory. The forced conservation 
29  One may think of a duty to provide the world economy with scarce resources (see 
section 2) or a duty to transfer resource revenues to the global poor. The substantiation of 
any such duty can, however, be expected to be much more controversial than the justification 
of the harm principle.
46 Frank Dietrich 
LEAP 6 (2018)
of natural resources confines a people’s space of action but normally leaves 
many other options open. If a people is, for example, prohibited from 
exploiting a coal deposit, it still can take independent decisions on the use 
of the area concerned. Typically, there will be several possibilities – 
declaring a natural reserve, erecting new settlements, establishing an 
industrial zone – the political representatives can choose from. By contrast, 
the forced extraction of natural resources requires a specific action that 
may exclude every other option. In particular, large-scale projects, such as 
coal mining, profoundly affect the relevant area and allow of no additional 
usages a people could decide on.
Although prohibitions on the extraction of natural resources are usually 
less detrimental to peoples’ capacity for self-determination, it should not 
go unnoticed that their impact can vary greatly. The forced conservation of 
raw materials tends to weaken the political autonomy of developing 
countries much more than those of highly industrialized countries. In 
many cases, the export of natural resources provides an important source 
of income for the inhabitants of developing countries. If they are banned 
from selling valuable raw materials, their revenues and consequently their 
set of options will be significantly reduced. By contrast, technologically 
advanced societies normally have other possibilities to generate the 
financial means in order to pursue important collective goals. Therefore, 
the imposition of a duty to preserve (some) natural resources has to take 
the economic situation of the peoples concerned into consideration. If 
their potential for self-determination is impaired to a greater degree, 
prohibiting the exploitation of natural resources requires a stronger 
justification.30
Second, a people’s political autonomy also depends on the kind of 
competences that are conferred to other actors. On the one hand, some 
global or multilateral institution could be authorized to establish rules 
regulating the use of raw materials. Thereby, it would have decision-
making power over the exploitation or conservation of the natural 
resources in question. The agents of the institution would, however, not be 
allowed to implement or enforce its regulations within the territory of a 
people. On the other hand, some external authority could be entitled to 
directly access the raw materials over which it enjoys control rights. In this 
case, its agents would be free to enter a people’s territory and to organize 
30  Although Armstrong (2017: 233-238) is not much concerned with the political self-
determination of peoples, he makes a similar point regarding the welfare of their members. 
Poor societies who are required to leave (part of) their natural resources unexploited can, in 
his view, legitimately claim compensation for the loss of development opportunities.
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the extraction of natural resources or to safeguard their preservation.31
Granting some global or multilateral institution the right to operate on 
the territory of a people would have the most negative impact on its capacity 
for self-determination. The application of norms regulating the use of 
natural resources normally leaves the political representatives of a people 
with some scope of discretion. This residual decision-making power would 
be lost if an external authority were directly responsible for the exploitation 
(or conservation) of the raw materials in question. Moreover, the right to 
manage part of the natural resources on a people’s territory may entail 
additional competences in other policy fields. For instance, in order to 
successfully run a coal mining project it may be necessary to develop the 
transport infrastructure and to admit skilled workers. Arguably, an 
external actor who is entitled to initiate the extraction of coal must also 
have a say in a country’s transport and migration policy. As a consequence, 
the self-determination of a people would be restricted in a number of 
spheres only indirectly related to the use of natural resources.
If the relevant international authority is prohibited from entering a 
people’s territory, much depends on how its regulations are formulated. 
Peoples who have to conform to general standards typically enjoy some 
degree of discretion, whereas peoples who have to follow more specific 
instructions widely lack decision making power. For instance, a country, 
which is required to produce a certain amount of natural gas per annum, 
may still be able to take independent decisions on the development of 
deposits or the prohibition of drilling technologies. Likewise, a country, 
which is obliged to preserve eighty percent of its rainforests, can freely 
determine the areas where a protection zone shall be established. Since 
general norms allow for different specifications, they enable (to some 
extent) the political representatives of a people to bring important 
collective goals and values to bear. By contrast, more detailed directives of 
an external authority deprive peoples of the possibility to decide in 
accordance with their own preferences.
In sum, restrictions of control rights necessarily diminish a people’s 
political autonomy and require, therefore, a sufficiently strong justification. 
The most widely accepted reason for constraining control rights is provided 
by the harm principle, which prohibits a people from damaging third 
parties. Arguments for (or against) the limitation of control rights have to 
consider the seriousness of the harm and possible impacts on a people’s 
capacity for self-determination. As explicated above, the forced extraction 
31  In addition, Schuppert (2014: 87-94) has proposed to establish an International 
Court of the Environment authorized to make binding judgements on disputes concerning 
the use of natural resources.
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of natural resources tends to reduce a people’s decision-making power to a 
greater extent than the forced conservation of natural resources. 
Consequently, regulations imposing an obligation to exploit natural 
resources must be supported by stronger harm-related reasons. Conferring 
to an external authority the right to access natural resources directly has 
the most negative impact on a people’s capacity for self-determination. 
Such a curtailment of a country’s territorial integrity can only be justified 
in exceptional cases when peoples are constantly unwilling or unable to 
comply with international norms.32
3.4. Two Objections
Finally, I will discuss two objections that may be raised to the here defended 
interpretation of peoples’ sovereignty over natural resources. A weakness 
of the above given argument may, first, be seen in the fact that I have 
characterized the right to political self-determination as a threshold 
concept. In subsection 3.2, I have maintained that the members of a self-
determining collective only need a minimum amount of alternatives 
between which they can freely decide. If a people lacks authority over the 
exploitation of (part of) the natural resources on a given territory, its set of 
options is thereby restricted, but it may still be able to choose between a 
variety of competing goals. Therefore, one may object that my 
understanding of the principle of resource sovereignty is compatible with 
assigning quite extensive control rights to other actors. Even restrictions, 
which do not protect third parties from harm, may appear to be justified as 
long as they remain below the critical threshold.33
Here it is important to note that the right to collective self-determination 
– like the right to individual self-determination – consists of two elements. 
The right holder must, first, possess a sufficient number of options and, 
second, be free from external coercion.34 For instance, the self-
determination right of a patient would be seriously violated if a physician 
forced her to undergo a certain treatment. This would also be true if she 
were able to choose between many qualitatively different options outside 
the medical context. Likewise, granting a third party authority over natural 
resources may leave a people with the opportunity to decide many other 
social, economic and cultural issues. However, the entitlement of some 
32  For a brief examination of “ecological interventions”, see Schuppert (2014: 84-85).
33  A related criticism is discussed and rejected in Banai (2016: 17-18).
34  As regards the violation of individual autonomy, Raz (1986: 377) states: “Coercion 
diminishes a person’s options. It is sometimes supposed that that provides a full explanation 
of why it invades autonomy. It reduces the coerced person’s options below adequacy. But it 
need not. One may be coerced not to pursue one option while being left with plenty of others 
to choose from.”
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foreign actor to control the use of raw materials located on the territory of 
a people runs contrary to this people’s right to collective self-determination. 
For instance, thwarting the goal to preserve natural habitats or traditional 
buildings by mandating the extraction of coal clearly amounts to a form of 
alien domination.
A second objection that may be raised to the here proposed concept of 
resource sovereignty concerns the hogging of natural resources. Peoples 
enjoying self-determination rights may decide against extracting raw 
materials that could be used to alleviate poverty in other world regions. In 
view of the plight of destitute persons, one may doubt whether peoples 
who control valuable resources should be entitled to abstain from their 
exploitation. In response to this concern I would like to emphasize that my 
understanding of resource sovereignty does not preclude a duty to extract 
natural resources. Given the adverse effects of such a duty for the political 
autonomy of the people concerned, its imposition has to be supported by 
weighty reasons. Whether or not the forced extraction of natural resources 
can be justified ultimately depends on issues of global justice I cannot 
discuss within the scope of this paper.
Moreover, it should be noted that my concept of peoples’ sovereignty 
over natural resources is in principle compatible with theories of global 
justice, which call for the taxation of resource ownership. Most importantly, 
Hillel Steiner (1994: 266-282 and 2011) argued that states whose inhabitants 
appropriated more than an equal share of the world’s natural resources 
owe compensation to states whose members under-appropriated the 
world’s natural resources. These states are required to pay a tax to a global 
fund, which shall be based on the rental value of their territories.35 
Evidently, the authorization of a global fund to levy taxes on resource 
ownership would interfere with peoples’ self-determination rights. 
However, the political representatives of a people would not be obliged to 
effect the extraction and sale of any raw materials located on the relevant 
territory. Provided that they had other sources of income enabling them to 
pay the tax, they could still opt for the conservation of natural resources.36 
It seems, however, worth noting that the establishment of a global fund, 
as proposed by Steiner, meets with two criticisms. First, to what extent a 
tax on resource ownership would diminish a people’s capacity for self-
determination depends very much on its economic situation. For poor 
35  According to John Locke’s theory of just appropriation, the tax disregards any 
improvements of the land and the natural resources located on it, which have been achieved 
through the investment of labor.
36  For a proposal to combine Pogge’s and Steiner’s theories by taxing the use and the 
ownership of natural resources, see Casal (2011a and 2011b).
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peoples it may be difficult, if not impossible, to pay the tax unless they 
exploit (part of) their natural resources, whereas rich peoples may still be 
able to decide in favor of resource conservation. Hence, in terms of self-
determination destitute peoples would be unfairly burdened by a global 
fund. Second, the imposition of a tax on consumption, as advocated by 
Pogge, would provide sensible incentives for a sustainable use of natural 
resources. By contrast, a tax on resource ownership would not encourage 
peoples to refrain from the exploitation of natural resources. Consequently, 
establishing a global fund would fail to meet the challenges of 
environmental degradation and global warming (Casal 2011a: 317-320 and 
Pogge 2011: 336-337).37
4. HOW SECESSION AFFECTS THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
PEOPLES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
In the preceding section, I have argued that the territorial interpretation of 
the permanent sovereignty of peoples over natural resources is not in 
contradiction to demands of global justice. If duties of assistance can be 
justified on a global scale, nothing stands in the way of reducing present 
inequalities by taxing resource-rich countries. A problem that has attracted 
much less interest in recent philosophical debates concerns the distribution 
of assets (and debts) after the break-up of states. Although in the past three 
decades a rich literature on the normative assessment of secession has 
emerged, the process of “political divorce” has not been discussed in much 
detail.38 In order to clarify whether and to what extent separatist states are 
entitled to the natural resources found on their territories, the distinction 
between control rights and income rights proves to be helpful again. This 
distinction suggests a morally more plausible approach to post-secession 
conflicts than the concept of unlimited sovereignty over natural resources 
on which international law currently relies.39
A state, which results from a legitimate secession, must be granted 
37  For a rejection of this criticism, see Steiner (2011: 332-333); for a response to 
Steiner’s defense, see Casal (2011b: 354-355).
38  The few authors who have dealt with questions of distributive justice that arise in 
the wake of secession have not specifically elaborated on natural resources (Dietrich 2014 
and Catala 2017).
39  According to the Vienna Convention on State Succession of 1983, agreements of 
the predecessor state and the newly independent state regarding state property (Art. 15.4) or 
state debts (Art. 38.2) “shall not infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every 
people over its wealth and natural resources”. See also Zimmermann (2007).
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control rights over the natural resources that are found within its borders.40 
If the rump state still had decision making power over the use of these raw 
materials, the self-determination right of the newly constituted people 
would be seriously impaired. For the reasons given above, the population 
of a separatist state might be unable to pursue its specific aims if a third 
party would be entitled to require the extraction or preservation of natural 
resources located within its borders. However, income rights are not a 
precondition for collective self-determination and, therefore, not implied 
in peoples’ sovereignty over natural resources. Contrary to international 
law, a newly created state is not necessarily entitled to the full amount of 
intakes, which can be generated from the natural resources located on its 
territory. 
By limiting the concept of resource sovereignty to control rights, 
important interests of the rump state’s population can be taken into 
account. Both parts of the now divided country may have made large 
investments in the development of raw material deposits situated in the 
break-away region. If the exploitation of resources was made possible by 
joint efforts of the “divorcees”, the population of the rump state has a 
legitimate claim to benefit from the gains. Consequently, the inhabitants 
of the separatist state are bound to share their resource revenues in a fair 
manner with their former fellow-citizens. The duty to transfer an 
appropriate part of the resource revenues to the rump state is, however, 
limited in two respects. First, the citizens of the rump state are not entitled 
to benefit from the utilization of raw materials that were still undeveloped 
or undiscovered at the time of secession. Since their claim to receive some 
part of the earnings is based on their contribution to the exploitation, it 
cannot extend to these resources. Second, the duty of the separatist state 
to share its resource revenues with the rump state will presumably decrease 
over time. The exploitation of raw materials requires ongoing investments 
in the technological equipment and the infrastructure that need to be 
maintained and modernized. The higher the expenditures of the separatist 
state are, the more diminishes the relative weight of the rump state’s former 
contributions. Hence, the share of the resource revenues to which the 
citizens of the rump state are entitled will usually shrink in the course of 
time.41
To the first-mentioned qualification it may be objected that the citizens 
40  Of course, the question of what requirements a secession must meet to be 
considered legitimate is a matter of dispute. Different views are expressed, for instance, in 
Buchanan (2004: 331-400), Miller (1995: 81-118) and Wellman (2005).
41  Since it will be difficult to exactly determine the changing shares of the resource 
revenues, the second qualification is best understood as a normative guideline for a 
negotiated settlement of both parties. 
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of the rump state had a legitimate expectation to benefit in the future from 
the exploitation of still undeveloped or undiscovered raw materials located 
on the separatist territory. Therefore, one may argue, they should receive 
an appropriate share of the earnings that will be generated from these 
resources. Here it is important to recall that I only consider cases when the 
population of the break-away regions had a moral right to create an 
independent state. Although the inhabitants of the remaining regions may 
not have reckoned with the secession, they have not been wronged by it. 
Generally speaking, the expectation of an actor A that some other actor B 
will not choose an option to which she is entitled cannot ground a moral 
claim against B. A may perhaps have good epistemic reasons, given her 
experience or knowledge, not to anticipate B’s decision. However, A is not 
normatively justified in expecting B to forego a morally permissible 
action.42 Hence, if the secession was legitimate, the rump state’s population 
cannot substantiate a claim to benefit from the exploitation of undeveloped 
or undiscovered resources.
Finally, the question needs to be addressed whether a separatist state 
has compensatory duties even if it terminates the exploitation of profitable 
resources. The citizens of the rump state may have made large financial 
contributions to the development of some raw materials and may, therefore, 
feel entitled to a fair share of the revenues that would have been generated 
had the secession not occurred. In my view, in the situation described 
compensatory claims are for two reasons unwarranted. First, the separatist 
state might be compelled to continue the exploitation of resources in order 
to be able to meet its financial obligations. The forced extraction of natural 
resources might make it extremely difficult, or even impossible, to realize 
important societal goals. Consequently, the self-determination right of the 
newly constituted people would be severely undermined by the rump 
state’s monetary claims.43 Second, it is generally assumed that sovereign 
states may reassess and change their energy policies over time. Thereby 
they do not incur compensatory duties against taxpayers for lost profits, 
although they may have contractual duties towards private investors. 
Given that the secession was legitimate, the same moral criteria must apply 
to the newly independent state as to any other state. Hence, the separatist 
state can be under a duty to share its resource revenues (to a diminishing 
degree) with the rump state, but it need not make compensatory payments 
if it decides to end the extraction and to forego potential gains.
42  For a brief discussion of the distinction between justified epistemic and justified 
normative expectations, see Meyer and Sanklecha (2014: 370-372).
43  As explicated in section 3.3, the forced extraction of natural resources is likely to 
have a more negative impact on a people’s capacity for self-determination than the forced 
conservation of natural resources.
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In sum, the here proposed interpretation of peoples’ permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources enables the international community 
to respond to post-secession conflicts in a balanced way. By granting the 
separatist state substantial control rights over the natural resources 
located on its territory the political self-determination of the newly created 
people can be effectively protected. By restricting the resource-related 
income rights of the separatist state the justified demands of the rump 
state’s population can be taken into account. The separatists’ duty to share 
their resource revenues with the rump state’s population has the additional 
advantage to provide sensible incentives. Although this duty is qualified in 
two important respects, it will tend to discourage secessions, which are 
primarily motivated by economic reasons. Hence, the concept of the 
permanent sovereignty of peoples over natural resources defended above 
promises a stabilizing effect on the international order.
 
5. CONCLUSION
In the penultimate section, I have examined three possible explanations 
for the close connection between a people’s right to political self-
determination and its permanent sovereignty over natural resources as 
established in international law. I have, first, argued against the attribution 
of property rights (or similarly acquired jurisdictional rights) to the 
collectives concerned and I have, second, criticized an instrumentalist 
view of the relationship between natural resources and political self-
determination. Instead, I have proposed to understand peoples’ sovereignty 
over natural resources as an aspect of their territorial authority, which 
is a necessary precondition for actualizing the right to political 
self-determination.
Based on this interpretation, an important distinction between control 
rights and income rights can be established. A self-determining people is 
– within the limits set by the harm principle – entitled to decide on the 
utilization or conservation of the natural resources located on its territory. 
However, it has not necessarily a claim to the full amount of intakes that 
can be generated from the exploitation of these resources. The restriction 
of income rights allows for reconciling the permanent sovereignty of 
peoples over natural resources with demands of global justice. In addition, 
as I have shown in the last section, the here defended interpretation 
provides a sensible answer to resource conflicts that may arise in the wake 
of secession. If the population of a rump state has made a significant 
contribution to the development of natural resources situated in the 
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breakaway region, it can be granted a claim to a fair share of the separate 
state’s revenues.
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